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Abstract
It has been suggested that ￿scal federalism is a good way to induce
decentralized entities to behave parsimoniously, but this has been largely
criticized in the literature, in particular because of the Common-Pool
problem. In this paper, we present an extra facet of the latter problem.
We present a simple theoretical model con￿rmed by empirical evidence
suggesting that vertical imbalance induces govenments to substitute re-
distributive spending for non-distributive expenditures. This drives ￿scal
policies to be less e¢ cient in reducing income inequality.
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11 Introduction
Income inequality has seriously increased since the late 1970s (see Atkinson,
1997 and Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997, for example) and is probably higher
than it has ever been. An emerging literature is investigating the sources of this
rising trend, emphasizing the role of skill-biased technological change (see e.g.
Piketty, 2000 and Acemoglu, 2003). At the same time, a general trend toward
￿scal decentralisation has been observed both in developed and developing coun-
tries (see e.g. Pisauro 2002, Wildasin 1997, Ter-Minassian 1997). Are these
two features related? Can federalism be seen as one of the causes of increasing
income inequality? Data tend to support this link; indeed the average income
inequality of countries with federal structures (measured by the Gini index) is
around 0.33, while those that have very centralized States average about 0.27
(and the di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cative)1.
In the literature, several e⁄ects that might explain this relation have been
suggested, yet, to the best of our knowledge, the speci￿c role played by a
Common-Pool ￿nancing on the distribution of incomes has not been identi-
￿ed up to now. What we show in this paper is that central ￿nancing of local
expenditures, will induce a replacement of (national) redistributive expenditures
by (local) non-redistributive ones, a⁄ecting the income distribution negatively2.
1Note that results are similar if we look at median instead of average levels of inequality.
2The de￿nition of public goods used is the one suggested by Breton (1965): i.e. public
goods can be seen as externality-generating goods that have di⁄erent levels of spatial in￿uence.
A good (or a service) is considered as belonging to a given level (e.g. national, regional, etc) if
the externalities that it generates bene￿t individuals of the corresponding dimension. Public
goods that generate externalities at the national level are thus called national public goods,
while those which produce geographically limited externalities are called local public goods .
As will be shown later, given this de￿nition, only national public goods have redistributive
e⁄ects.
2The intuition for this is that before the budget constraint becomes binding,
each entity maintains the national public good at its optimal level and only
increases local public goods spending. Once the budget constraint becomes
binding, entities will try to freeride on national expenditures demanded by the
other jurisdictions and use the available common resources to consume local
public goods. Since all of the entities play the same game, a classical prisoner￿ s
dilemma will occur implying a suboptimal solution. Indeed the result will be
that in case of common ￿nancing, there will be an overprovision of local public
goods and an underprovision of the national public goods.
The Common-Pool problem was ￿rst described by the mathematician Forster
Lloyd in 1833. But it was not really explicited until 1968, when Hardin, in his
famous article entitled ￿The Tragedy of the Commons￿ , introduced the idea
that when agents make individual decisions on a common property, the result
is its overexploitation. The transposition of this idea to the ￿eld of public ￿-
nance led to a thorough economic analysis of the problem. Weingast et al.
(1981) formalized this idea and showed that, in federal systems, since decen-
tralized expenditures are ￿nanced by the central level, the real cost of goods
and services supplied at the local level will be underestimated and there will be
an overprovision of public goods. This feature has been con￿rmed empirically
by many authors, among others, Rodden (2003), Stein (1998) and Borge and
Rattso (2002). In the corresponding economic literature, there is quite a large
consensus on the result given above.
To avoid excessive public spending, it might be argued that the central State
could set a maximal spending limit for each decentralized entity. Even if this
idea seems e¢ cient, it is extremely di¢ cult to implement in practice. Indeed,
decentralized entities, when choosing their budget, anticipate the fact that they
3will most likely face a soft budget constraint (Kornai et al., 2003) and will over-
spend anyway. With a similar reasoning, Wildasin (1999) argues that no central
State can a⁄ord the bankruptcy of any decentralized entity (especially if it is
large) because the resulting economic disequilibria would be unsustainable. This
likely bailout, in case of ￿scal misbehavior, renders the idea of a limitation of
the overspending associated with the Common-Pool problem inapplicable. As
suggested by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972), another possible solution might
be to link local expenditures to local revenues. However, even this causes prob-
lems: several authors (e.g. Oates and Schwab, 1988, Zodrow and Mieszowkski,
1986 and Wildasin, 1989) suggest that, apart from the potential polarization of
wealth, this might result in a race to the bottom in taxation, implying that the
collected revenues would be too limited, leading to an underprovision of public
goods. Even if Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) somewhat relativize the above-
mentioned tax competition problem by stating that vertical externalities pull
spending upwards, it seems that the ine¢ ciencies associated with the Common-
Pool problem will always appear in a multilevel State. Our idea is that the
Common-Pool problem will furthermore limit the redistributive e⁄ect of ￿scal
policies since it induces low levels of redistributive spending. Assuming an ex-
treme simpli￿cation of government expenditures, i.e. only two types of public
goods (one which generates country-level externalities and thus has redistribu-
tive e⁄ects (national public good) and the other which does not (local public
good)), we present a model which shows that, in case of common ￿nancing, the
national public good will be replaced by local ones.
The structure of the paper is the following: after this introduction, in section
2 we present a simple model. In section 3, we detail the methodology we follow
and the data we use to test the predictions of the model and in section 4 we
4present our main results. In the ￿fth and ￿nal section, we conclude.
2 The Model
Before presenting the model, it is important to explain why national public
goods are redistributive. Imagine a world composed of two individuals with
unequal incomes. If they do not interact, the national public good consumption
of each individual will depend solely on his personal wealth, i.e. the rich one
will have more than the poor one. Both individuals would obviously be much
better o⁄ if they had access to a higher level of public good consumption, but
they do not want to spend more than the strict minimum ensuring a su¢ cient
satisfaction level of their preferences. Now, if the individuals decide to interact,
the public good consumption of each individual will not only depend on his own
wealth, but also on that of the other. This is due to the fact that a national
public good generates externalities that will bene￿t everyone. In case of coop-
eration, the rich individual will receive an amount equivalent to what he would
have been willing to pay, plus something extra generated by the externality
coming from the consumption of the poor one. The poor individual, similarly,
will receive much more than what he would have been able to a⁄ord alone. It is
obvious that the externalities directed from the rich toward the poor are much
higher those in the opposite direction. A national public good will thus have ma-
jor redistributive e⁄ects. Since local public goods do not generate externalities,
they will have no redistributive e⁄ect. The main type of national redistributive
public good is obviously the welfare state.
The model considered here is an extension of the single-period local public
goods model of Persson and Tabellini3 (2000), in which we introduce both a
3Chapter 7, page 161.
5national public good and local public goods at the same time, to take into
account the possible substitution that might occur between the two types of
goods.
Assume a country composed of J distinct regions inside each of which individuals
share identical preferences. Preferences may vary between regions. The size of
region k (k = 1;:::;J) is Nk, with
J P
k=1
Nk = N, where N is the total population
size. There are three types of goods in the economy, a region-speci￿c private
good, denoted by cj in region j, and two types of public goods: a national public
good denoted by T and J local public goods4, denoted in each region j by gj.
The externalities generated by T a⁄ect all of the regions in the same way. For
the purpose of the model, following Mas-Colell et al. (1995), the national public
good T is de￿ned as the sum of all individual demands for it (tk will denote the
demand of any individual of region k for that good).
The utility function wj of each individual of region j is quasi-linear. It is
given by
wj = cj + H(gj) + S(T) (1)
where cj represents the private good consumption of an individual of region j,
gj represents the per capita supply of a local public good in region j, and T




Functions H(￿) and S(￿) are assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave with H(0) = 0 and S(0) = 0. Individual income (yj for the individuals
of region j) is identical for all individuals within a region but not necessarily
between regions. One unit of income (private consumption) can be transformed
with no cost either into a unit of one of the J local public goods or into a unit
4Without loss of generality, to simplify notations in the model, from here on we will consider
that local public goods do not generate any externalities.
6of the national public good. Finally, we assume non distortionary taxation.
2.1 First Best Solution: Maximizing Aggregate Utility
As a normative benchmark we consider the utilitarian optimum obtained by

















Njtj = Ny (3)
where y represents the overall average income5, ensuring that the aggregate
revenue in the entire economy is equal to the sum of aggregate consumption of






Njtj ￿ ￿Ny (4)
where ￿ represents the maximal proportion of income that the government can
levy from the economy6, ensuring that the government does not spend more
than it raises from taxes.
The ￿rst order conditions of the maximization problem yield
H0(g
p




(1 + ￿); 8p = 1;:::;J (6)
where ￿ is a Lagrange multiplier and subscript FB means ￿First Best￿ .
5Implying that Ny represents the aggregate income of all individuals in the country.
6Something comparable to the notion of maximum tolerable level of taxation de￿ned by
Peacock and Wiseman (1961).
7These results are quite standard: the usual optimality condition for local
public goods holds (i.e. marginal utility is equal to marginal social cost) and for
the national public good, the Samuelson (1954, 1955) condition for Benthamite
utility holds.
2.2 Common-Pool Solution: Maximizing Local Utility
Under ￿scal federalism, decentralized entities can choose some expenditures on
the basis of their preferences. As stated by many scholars (e.g. Oates, 1972
and Musgrave, 1959) taxes cannot be completely decentralized (especially those
associated with mobile bases) otherwise a massive move of the population and
even of ￿rms would occur. This would lead to an unsustainable situation, since it
would create a progressive polarization of wealth. A degree of decentralization
of expenditures higher than that of revenues will thus generally be observed.
This creates what is called the ￿Common-Pool problem￿ .
Under decentralization, each jurisdiction will maximize its individual utility
function under a global budget constraint. The functions to maximize are
wj = cj + H(gj) + S(T) j = 1;:::;J (7)
where private consumption is the available income7, i.e. the di⁄erence between
income yj and lump-sum taxation ￿.
cj = yj ￿ ￿ (8)






Niti ￿ ￿Ny (9)
7Due to quasi-linear preferences.






Niti = N￿ (10)
guaranteeing that the global amount which is spent is equal to the total resources
of the government. In other words, ￿everybody pays for everybody￿ .
The ￿rst-order conditions of the maximization problems yield
H0(g
p
CP) = (1 + ￿p)
Np
N
8p = 1;:::;J (11)
S0(TCP) = (1 + ￿p)
1
N
8p = 1;:::;J (12)
where the ￿ps are Lagrange multipliers and subscript CP means ￿Common-
Pool￿ .
2.3 Discussion
>From the ￿rst-order conditions, we will show that, in the Common-Pool case,
once the budget constraint becomes binding, decentralized entities will tend to
substitute national public goods for local ones . On the other hand, if the budget
constraint is not binding, there will be overspending and we will show that it will
only be directed toward local public goods. These results are proven hereunder
on the basis of three lemmas. The ￿rst one shows that only a subset of the
possible values of the Lagrange multipliers of the First-Best and Common-Pool
problems are mathematically pertinent. The second and third lemmas detail
and interpret the feasible cases.
Lemma 1 ￿ < ￿p or ￿ = ￿p = 0 for each p.
8It can easily be shown that under (9) and (10) the resource constraint is necessarily
satis￿ed and can thus be omitted in this maximization problem.
9Proof. By (12) it is clear that all ￿ps are identical.
Assume ￿rst that ￿ > ￿p.









For each p, we have H0(g
p
FB) = 1 + ￿ which, by our initial assumption, is
larger than (1 + ￿p)N
p
N , i.e. H0(g
p
CP) .




















We also have S0(TFB) = 1
N(1 + ￿): The assumption ￿ > ￿p for each p
thus implies that S0(TFB) is larger than 1
N(1 + ￿p) i.e. S0(TCP). Given the
assumptions we made on S(￿), we get
TFB < TCP (14)

















NTCP ￿ ￿y, a contradiction.
A similar proof shows that ￿ = ￿p > 0 is impossible.
Having shown that either ￿ = 0 = ￿p or ￿ < ￿p for each p, we now turn to
the interpretation of these two cases.
Lemma 2 If ￿ = 0 = ￿p for each p, there will be overprovision of local public
goods in the Common-Pool set-up with respect to the First-Best situation, while




CP for each p
and TFB = TCP.
10Proof. >From ￿ = 0 = ￿p, (5) and (11), we have H0(g
p









CP). Given the initial assump-





Similarly, ￿ = 0 = ￿p, (6) and (12) imply that S0(TFB) = 1
N and S0(TCP) = 1
N,
thus S0(TFB) = S0(TCP) which implies TFB = TCP.
When ￿ = 0 = ￿p, either one or both of the constraints are binding which, as
in the proof of Lemma 1, results in a contradiction, or neither of the constraints
is binding and the overspending associated with the Common-Pool problem is
entirely directed toward local public goods.
Lemma 3 If ￿ < ￿p, in the Common-Pool case there will be an overprovision of
local public goods and an underprovision of the national public good with respect




CP and TFB > TCP.
Proof. We ￿rst show that if ￿ < ￿p, then necessarily ￿p < N
Np(1 + ￿) ￿ 1.
If not, then, on the one hand, N
p
























On the other hand, since S0(TFB) = 1
N(1 + ￿) and S0(TCP) = 1
N(1 + ￿p),
￿ < ￿p implies S0(TFB) < S0(TCP). Then, given the initial assumptions on
S(￿), we have
TCP < TFB (16)














FB + TFB which
means that a central funding for local spending would lead to a lower aggregate
11demand for local and national public goods by decentralized entities. This
contradicts all of the existing literature on the Common-Pool problem.
As a result, recalling that H0(g
p
FB) = 1 + ￿ and H0(g
p
CP) = (1 + ￿p)N
p
N ,
from ￿p < N









Similarly, recalling that S0(TFB) = 1
N(1 + ￿) and S0(TCP) = 1
N(1 + ￿p), from
￿ < ￿p, we get S0(TFB) < S0(TCP) implying TFB > TCP.
This means that when the budget constraint is binding, there will be a
replacement of the national good by local ones.
Proposition: If the budget constraint is not binding, there will be an overprovi-
sion of public goods in case of common ￿nancing. This overprovision will be due
to an excessively high level of local expenditures, while national public expendi-
tures will be provided at the optimal level. If the budget constraint is binding,
there will be an overprovision of local public goods and an underprovision of the
national public good.
Proof. By Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
Given that, as stated above, national public goods have redistributive e⁄ects,
from the results of the model, we expect that when local public expenditures rely
heavily on central funding (i.e. in the presence of the Common-Pool problem),
￿scal policies will be much less e¢ cient in reducing income inequality. In the
following section, we test this empirically.
123 Data and Methodology
Before presenting the data in detail, it is important to highlight that, in practice,
it is almost impossible to separate, in the government ￿nance statistics, goods
that have national externalities from those that do not. For instance, if we look
at education expenditures, it is obvious that part of them, such as the building of
schools, might not generate any national externality at all, while another, such as
a general public subvention for school fees, does. Similarly, health expenditures
can be used to build a local hospital, but can also be used to partially intervene in
the private provision of a drug. Several attempts have been made to distinguish
local from national goods (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1999 or Milesi-Ferretti
et al., 2002) but, even if the problem is somehow mitigated, no clear-cut solution
has been provided and we remain convinced that there is no simple way to
separate national from local public goods, if we rely on government ￿nance
statistics. Our idea here is di⁄erent. Instead of trying to proxy local and national
public goods by an exotic measure, we simply do not consider them directly, but
rather look at income inequality before and after taxes and redistribution and
check if there is a link between the reduction of income inequality due to ￿scal
policies and the intensity of the vertical imbalance (measured as the degree of
dependence of local expenditure vis-￿-vis central ￿nancing).
3.1 The Data
In this paper, we want to test if, because of the Common-Pool problem, ￿scal
policies in federal systems are less e¢ cient in reducing income inequality than
those in centralized systems. To do so, it is necessary to calculate an index
of income inequality before and after taxes and redistribution, to check if the
inequality reduction is related to the degree of vertical imbalance of local ￿nanc-
13ing. To the best of our knowledge, the only high quality dataset that can be
used for this purpose, as explained in Roland and Verardi (2005), is the Lux-
embourg Income Study (LIS) project database. The latter covers 29 (OECD)
countries and, on average, 4 years for each country. Given that micro-level data
are available for income, many inequality measures can be envisaged. In this
paper, we have chosen to use two indices: the well-known Gini index and the










. The former is chosen for
its easy interpretation, the latter because, while providing similar information
as the Gini index, it ful￿lls all the necessary conditions to be considered as a
good measure of inequality10 (see Litch￿eld, 1999). To measure the vertical
imbalance, i.e. the degree of dependence of decentralized expenditures on cen-
tral State ￿nancing, we simply calculate the ratio of decentralized expenditures
over decentralized revenues. A value of one means that decentralized revenues
￿nance all local expenditures, while a value above one means that local revenues
only ￿nance part of them.
It is important to be cautious here in order to avoid mixing di⁄erent e⁄ects
of federalism: to clearly separate the Common-Pool e⁄ect from others, we in-
troduce a measure of the degree of federalization of the State. Two variables
are considered: the ￿rst is a dummy, equal to one if the State is constitutionally
federal and zero otherwise, the second is a measure of the degree of decentral-
ization calculated as the percentage of decentralized expenditures with respect
to total expenditures. The data we use are taken from the Government Fi-
nance Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund and the Database
of Political Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank.
9Where yi represents the income of person i, and ￿ y represents the average income.
10The Gini index, on the other hand, does not satisfy the decomposability property.
143.2 The Methodology
The speci￿cation of the regression model is simple and of the following type
ln(RIit) = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(Fedit) + ￿2 ln(V Iit) + ￿ ￿3Zit + ￿4 ln(Imit) + "it (17)
where RIit is the rate of reduction of inequality as de￿ned above, Fedit is a
measure of federalism, V Iit is a measure of vertical imbalance, Zit is a set of
control variables (and thus ￿ ￿3 is a vector of coe¢ cients) and Imit is the level
of inequality calculated on market prices. Indices i and t respectively represent
the country and the year. Imit is considered among the exogenous variables,
to correct for the di⁄erent initial levels of income inequality. In such a way, we
identify the e⁄ect of decentralization on the reduction of inequality from gross
to net incomes, independently of the initial level (or in other words, setting all
of the countries at the same market price income inequality). The dependent
variable is in logarithm in order to work with elasticities11.
The control variables are those which are generally used in regressions in
which inequality is the dependent variable. The ￿rst two are GDP per capita and
GDP per capita squared, since Kuznets (1955) and Lewis (1954) suggest that
there should be an inverted U relation between development and inequality. The
third control variable captures the age structure of the population (percentage of
people older than 65) considered because Deaton (1997) argues that inequality
should increase with the age of the population, the reason being that young
people have more similar incomes than older ones (Deaton and Paxson (1994)).
The incorporation in the regression of the fourth control variable (secondary
school or higher diploma obtained by people older than 25) is motivated by
Tinbergen (1975), Lodoæo et al. (1997) and Li et al. (1998), who suggest that
11Note that RI will never be negative.
15a higher educational attainment is expected to decrease inequality. Taking into
account the degree of openness of the country (measured as the logarithm of the
sum of exports and imports in percentage of GDP) is aimed at controlling for
the link between trade openness and inequality (as described in the World Bank
Assessing Globalization Brie￿ng Paper, 2000). Finally, a dummy identifying
presidential regimes and a variable measuring the degree of proportionality of the
electoral rule are incorporated to take into account the political e⁄ects predicted
and estimated by Roland and Verardi (2005). Note that we also control for
regional ￿xed e⁄ects, ethnic fractionalization, the British legal origin (to remove
an eventual Anglo-Saxon e⁄ect) and the degree of democracy (as measured by
Jaggers and Marshall, 2002). We tried to control for time e⁄ects, but it turns
out that the only signi￿cant time e⁄ect is for 1980. To avoid losing too many
degrees of freedom, we only control for that speci￿c year. It is important to note
that we only consider periods and countries for which the level of democracy is
high (larger than 0, as measured by Jaggers and Marshall, 2002).
All of the data come from Roland and Verardi (2005). Even if the data on
income inequality are of a high quality and highly comparable over countries
and years, small di⁄erences remain between and within countries, but these
di⁄erences should not a⁄ect the results. For example, even if there is a change
over time in the survey on which inequalities are calculated in France, Germany
and the Netherlands, the de￿nitions of the variables remain the same. Since we
do not consider changes over time but only between systems, this should not
a⁄ect the results. Finally some calculations include net income variables only
and some data on taxes are incomplete. To correct for this, we created two
dummies identifying each case and included them on the right hand side of the
regression. For the sake of clarity, we do not present the coe¢ cients associated
16with these variables in the table of results.
4 Results
To start the analysis, we need to choose the most appropriate estimation model.
The ￿rst thing to do is to check if variations of the dependent variable (reduction
in inequality due to ￿scal policies) are better explained by cross-country or by
time variations. This will yield information on which model will provide the
best information. For this purpose, we run an ANOVA analysis and present the
results in Table 1. This analysis also allows to understand if the small di⁄erences
in de￿nitions mentioned above a⁄ect the results. As can be seen in Table 1, they
do not.
Table 1: Analysis of Variance of Reduction in Inequality Measurements
Index Source Partial SS DF F P-value % of Total
Theil Model 24.35 27 97.14 0.00 97.21
Country 23.62 24 106.01 0.00 94.29
Time 0.11 1 12.15 0.00 0.44
Income 0.00 1 0.06 0.80 0.00
Taxes 0.00 1 0.30 0.59 0.00
Residual 0.70 75
Total 25.05 102
Gini Model 32.17 27 93.33 0.00 97.10
Country 31.19 24 101.79 0.00 94.14
Time 0.29 1 22.55 0.00 0.88
Income 0.00 1 0.01 0.94 0.00
Taxes 0.00 1 0.13 0.72 0.00
Residual 0.96 75
Total 33.13 102
Notes: DF: Degrees of Freedom, SS:Sum of Squares, F: F-statistic
Considering that the dataset is unbalanced, we ￿nd that 97% of the variance
of the reduction in inequality is explained by cross-country variations and less
than 1% by within country variations. The slight di⁄erences in net income and
taxes (as described above) do not a⁄ect the variance of the reduction of inequal-
17ity since the F-statistic associated with the two last variables is lower than its
critical value at 5%. This supports our idea that these small imprecisions do not
a⁄ect the generality of the results. Given these results, cross-sectional models
will be preferred. In addition, it is important to stress that changes in the degree
of decentralization are too limited to get accurate ￿within￿country estimations
given the short time span available. As far as cross-sectional models are con-
cerned, we prefer to use pooled estimations instead of between estimations for
several reasons. First, the availability of the data changes quite a lot over time
from country to country. It does not make much sense then to compare aver-
ages calculated over time, since this would amount to comparing di⁄erent time
periods. Second, some time shocks must be accounted for (such as, for instance,
the big drop of 1980 highlighted in the analysis). Finally, this allows to keep
the number of degrees of freedom su¢ ciently high. A random-e⁄ect model is
not considered at all, because it is di¢ cult to believe in the strict independence
of right hand side variables with the permanent component of the error term,
when working with countries.
In Table 2, we present the estimation of (17), with pooled least-squares.
The general result is that common ￿nancing induces less e¢ cient anti-inequality
policies12. This can be easily explained by the model presented in Section 2:
when the budget constraint is binding, there will be an overprovision of local
public goods and an underprovision of the national public good in the Common-
Pool problem. As explained previously, a national public good has redistributive
e⁄ects; its underprovision under Common-Pool funding will in￿ uence the income
12Fixed-e⁄ect models yield similar results for the decentralization variable, but are not
considered here since the ANOVA analysis shows that between country estimations allow to
explain a larger share of the variance of the dependent variable. Futhermore, classical Chow
and Lagrange multiplier tests show that a pooled model should be preferred.
18distribution negatively. Furthermore, the higher the dependence on the central
State for local expenditures, the more critical the problem becomes. Indeed, if
we double the degree of dependence of local expenditures on central revenues,
the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policies in reducing income inequality will decrease by
20 to 25% 13. Knowing that ￿scal policies reduce, in average, income inequality
by 50%, we understand that this e⁄ect is extremely important.
13In all of the speci￿cations, the White test for homeskedasticity strongly rejects the pres-
ence of heteroskedasticity. Note that residuals are normally distributed in all speci￿cations.
19Table 2: Reduction in Inequality and Decentralization
Theil Gini
Federal Dummy -0.18￿￿￿ -0.22￿￿￿
(3.73) (3.79)
Ln (Decentralization Indicator) -0.24￿￿￿ -0.27￿￿￿
(5.20) (4.64)
Ln (Vertical Imbalance) -0.20￿￿￿ -0.20￿￿￿ -0.26￿￿￿ -0.24￿￿￿
(3.44) (3.85) (3.76) (3.84)
Ln (Mean District Magnitude) 0.09￿￿￿ 0.12￿￿￿ 0.14￿￿￿ 0.18￿￿￿
(4.09) (6.97) (5.42) (7.76)
Presidential Democracy -0.24￿￿ -0.45￿￿￿ -0.46￿￿￿ -0.66￿￿￿
(2.19) (4.35) (3.30) (4.80)
British Colony -0.16 -0.15 -0.39￿￿￿ -0.32￿￿￿
(1.63) (1.66) (3.08) (2.68)
Schooling -0.01￿￿￿ -0.00￿￿￿ -0.01￿￿￿ -0.01￿￿￿
(4.06) (3.50) (5.88) (4.83)
Ethnic -0.39￿￿￿ -0.71￿￿￿ -0.50￿￿￿ -0.86￿￿￿
(3.52) (7.40) (3.70) (7.14)
Ln (Openness) 0.15￿￿￿ 0.06 0.29￿￿￿ 0.17￿￿￿
(3.13) (1.25) (5.18) (2.86)
Elderly 0.66 0.37 -0.27 -0.05
(0.58) (0.35) (0.18) (0.04)
Democracy 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.72) (1.27) (1.21) (1.42)
Ln (Market Price Inequality) 0.20￿￿￿ 0.17￿￿￿ 1.42￿￿￿ 1.17￿￿￿
(6.53) (5.93) (7.08) (5.92)
Dummy Year 1980 -0.33￿￿￿ -0.51￿￿￿ -0.45￿￿￿ -0.63￿￿￿
(2.79) (4.40) (3.24) (4.43)
Constant 3.55￿￿￿ 4.42￿￿￿ 4.38￿￿￿ 5.09￿￿￿
(8.37) (10.68) (7.68) (9.12)
Observations 71 71 71 71
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
Note: ￿ signi￿cant at 10%; ￿￿ signi￿cant at 5%; ￿￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%
Regional dummies are considered in all regressions
Among other results associated with ￿scal federalism, let us mention that the
coe¢ cient associated with the decentralization indicator is negative; its absolute
value is approximately 0.25. This means that if the degree of decentralization
doubles, the reduction of inequality will be reduced by 25%. The coe¢ cient
associated with the federalist dummy is negative in all speci￿cations; its absolute
20value is approximately 0.20. We ￿nd that in federal States14, the reduction in
income inequality due to ￿scal policies is about 18% lower than in centralized
States.
Given the small size and the unbalancedness of the sample, several problems
might occur in the estimation stage. To tackle these potential problems, we
present a simple sensitivity analysis. The ￿rst problem is that the panel is
unbalanced. Running a classical pooled regression leads to attributing the same
weight to all observations. In case more data is available for one country than
for another, we award more weight to the former. To correct for this, we run a
weighted regression, where the weight of each country is inversely proportional
to the number of available observations. This regression is called Weighted in
Table 3. It might then be argued that OLS is very sensitive to the presence of
outliers, and that our results might be created by some abnormal points. To
control for this, we ￿rst identify the outliers using the very robust least-median
of squares estimator introduced by Rousseeuw (1987) ( and then run a weighted
regression, giving them a weight zero (we call this Robust in Table 3). This is
the most drastic test we can perform and if the results do not change, the results
are clearly not driven by outliers. The results of our sensitivity analysis on the
variables we are interested in are presented in Table 3.
14As we are in a semi-logarithmic framework, we take the anti-log of this value and subtract
one.
21Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis
Theil Gini
Weighted
Federal Dummy -0.23￿￿￿ -0.26￿￿￿
(3.94) (4.51)
Ln (Decentralization Indicator) -0.26￿￿￿ -0.28￿￿￿
(4.57) (4.07)
Ln (Vertical Balance) -0.19￿￿￿ -0.21￿￿￿ -0.26￿￿￿ -0.25￿￿￿
(3.04) (3.15) (3.66) (3.22)
Robust
Federal Dummy -0.17￿￿￿ -0.24￿￿￿
(3.62) (3.92)
Ln (Decentralization Indicator) -0.24￿￿￿ -0.27￿￿￿
(4.50) (3.89)
Ln (Vertical Balance) -0.19￿￿￿ -0.19￿￿￿ -0.23￿￿￿ -0.25￿￿￿
(3.25) (4.29) (4.13) (4.00)
The sensitivity analysis clearly shows that the results are robust both to the
eventual presence of outliers and to a potential overrepresentation of some of
the countries.
225 Conclusions
It has been suggested that ￿scal federalism is a good way to induce decentralized
entities to behave parsimoniously. Some recent literature tends to criticize this
vision, suggesting that the expected positive e⁄ects are often overruled by neg-
ative ones. The famous Common-Pool problem is at the heart of the discussion.
The idea is that when local expenditures are centrally funded, decentralized
entities will tend to overspend since they do not have to face the entire ￿scal
burden of their budgetary decisions. Our intuition is that this overprovision
of public goods will not a⁄ect all of the spending in the same way. Indeed,
since some goods generate externalities, a strategic behavior will emerge: each
jurisdiction will concentrate its spending on local public goods and freeride on
the externalities generated by the national public good demanded by its neigh-
bors. If the budget constraint is not binding, this results in an overprovision
of local public goods but the national public good will be provided at its opti-
mal level. If the budget constraint is binding (which is what we believe really
happens), there will be a substitution of the national good by local ones. Since
positive externalities have redistributive e⁄ects, the Common-Pool reduces the
e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policies in reducing income inequalities.
The predictions of the model are not easy to test, since it is almost impossible
(in government ￿nance statistics) to di⁄erentiate goods that generate externali-
ties from those that do not. For this reason, we decided to tackle the problem in
an indirect way: on the basis of a database on individual incomes, we calculated
income inequality before and after taxes and redistribution. If the predictions of
our theoretical model are correct, the reduction in inequality should turn out to
be inversely related to the degree of vertical imbalance (measured as the degree
of dependence of local expenditures on central funding). Our results are con-
23clusive: we ￿nd that when the degree of vertical imbalance increases, the e⁄ect
of inequality reducing ￿scal policies decreases substantially. Regarding the size
of the e⁄ect, we ￿nd that when the degree of dependence of local expenditures
on central ￿nancing doubles, the e⁄ectiveness of these policies is reduced by
approximately 25%.
For several reasons highlighted in the literature on ￿scal federalism, it is
rather problematic to allow local entities to levy all of the taxes themselves, so
the Common-Pool problem is inevitable in federal States. Since a good ￿scal
system relies heavily on the criteria of justice (and e¢ ciency), we fear that the
tragedy of the commons is the curse of federalism.
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